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THE  COMPETITION  POLICY  OF  THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIE! 
What  you  call antitrust policy  In the United States  Is  In  the  languages 
of the European Communities  referred to as "polftlque de concurrence",  "polltica 
della concorrenza",  ''mededingingspol itiek'', ''Wettbewerbspol itik
11
•  11Antitrust 
policy'' derives its name  form  the context of econanic policy  in the United 
States shortly before the turn of the century.  We  in Europe  instead use the 
tena "caapetition pol icy'' to refer to the situation facing us today. 
What  is this situation? 
On  1 July of last year the tariff barriers between  the Membe~ States of 
the European  Econanlc  Camwnity were  removed.  Tariffs and  quotas,  the 
traditional  inst~ts of mercantilism,  of trade wars and  the quest for 
national  self-sufficiency, have disappeared.  Labour  and  capital  can  (if we 
Ignore the special  circumstances at present prevailing in France)  move  freely 
within the EEC  without let or hindrance.  The  result of all this is that 
national markets which for decades had  been  self-contained are more  and  more 
exposed to caapetitlon,  both because new  canpetitors have emerged  in the 
Member  States and  bec:cluse  canpetftors fran non-member  countries are seeking 
to turn to good account the. opportunities offered by  the large European 
market. 
·~ 
Art :additional  factor ts the enormous. aecelerati on  of  technical  progress, 
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reflected.irr a  sbortel'l1~g ~~he  tim~s,.nbetwe~ time of  invention and 
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ln,tfie  19th.~entt.try It still took  about loo  years 
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~~ the steam  engine, .and  about  50  years 
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fran the discovery of  the telephone and  photography,  to technical  appl i.catlon. 
The  ti~lag in our  time has  shortened to five years for  the splitting of the 
at011  and for cybernetics and to no more  than three years for  semiconductors. 
Canpetition pol icy should be carried out with  regard for modern  technical 
development  and its impact  on  the econany of the Canmon  Market.  It .must  be 
more than a  mere "anti-policy'', whether directed against  restrictive agreements 
or monopolies.  True,  the ban  on  restrictive agreements and  the prohibition of 
abuses  of dcminant  positions on  the market  provided for  by  Canmon  Market  rules 
of. canpet it  ion are  important and  permanent  eanponent  s  of canpet  i ti  on  pol icy. 
Care must  be taken to see that the Coomission's aims and  achievements  in 
freeing trade fran artificial barriers and distortions due to restraints of 
canpet it  ion  i s  not  undone by  the actions of firms  or Goverrvnent s.  Each  one 
of us,  W.ether consumer  or entrepreneur,  expects the Canmon  Market  to bring 
an  improvement  in his  living standards.  This expectation,  in addition to the 
political desire for European unification,  was  a  prime consideration 
motivating the conclusion of the European Treaties.  But  our hopes wi 1 t  not 
be fulfilled unless firms  in the Common  Market  really compete with  each  other 
as tariff, tax,  and  legal  barriers preventing the establishment  of a  domestic• 
type market are gradually eliminated.  Only this can ensure optimum  use of 
the factors of praduction,  the maintenance and strengthening of the 
ccapet it  i veness of European fIrms  on the wor 1  d market  and •• beyond  the pure  1  y 
econanic objectives -- the safeguardlt'lg of freedan ln a  way  .that  is consl stent 
with  ~r social  objectiv4ils.  The  Canmhsion  Is determined  to apply the bans· 
- - . 
"enerc~tica11y ""ere the need arJses.  The  last ttme  ft. made  thls clear ..,as  tn 
Infringement  of 
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Article 85.  One  decision  related to the  international  quinine agreement, 
with which  you  are also familiar.  The  second  decision was  in  respect  of 
concerted practices on  price increases by  several  manufacturers  (from  the 
Canmunity  and  two non-member  countries)  of ani I ine dyestuffs. 
What  I  have  said serves to establish the scope  of  European  competition 
policy.  The  instruments-- the ban  on  restrictive agreements  and  prohibition 
of abuse - correspond to those provided  by  American  antitrust  Jaw.  The  mere 
pursuit  of a  '_'prohibition pol icy" would,  however,  not  enable us  to cope  correctly 
with the actual  situation of firms  in the Common  Market.  The  process  of  integra-
tion and  technological  progress as  I  have  described  them  require firms to make 
far-reaching adjustments and  changes  almost  every day.  Firms  may  as a  result 
be confronted with major  problems,  necessitating even  the reorganization of 
entire industries.  The  second  important  task of  those  in  char£~ of  European 
ccmpetition policy ls in my  view to help firms to adapt. 
How  can this be done? 
It is certainly not  the task of  those responsible for competition policy 
to bring direct pressure to bear on  a  management  to force  it to take certain 
measures  of adaptation.  Nor  is it our  task to arrange co-operation between 
enterpri.ses or to help finance adaptation  investment.  Other means  of helping 
finns to adapt must .be used. 
~ol icy on  restrictive agreements 
-L.et  us first  consid~r the policy. on  restrictive agreements.  An  important 
way  in Wfl ich a  firm can  adapt  to new  market  cond it  1  ons  t s  by  co-operatIng with 
Co-operation may,  to quote a  few  examp 1  es on 1  y,  take the form  of 
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specialization agreements,  joint purchasing or selling arrangements,  joint 
research and  development  and  licensing or exclusive dealing agreements. 
Now,  the rules of competition of the European  Treaties apply to all 
these fonms  of co-operation.  In  simplified tenms,  the  rules forbid as a 
matter of principle all  restraints of  competition which  impair trade between 
Member  States, while allowing exemption  for  forms  of co-operation which  have 
effects that  from  an  overall  economic  point  of view must  be  deemed  beneficial. 
It is obvious that the opportunities for adaptation made  available to firms 
through  co-operation depend  on  the way  these rules are interpreted and  applied. 
Here  is a  field where  competition policy can  provide support.  But  here 
competition policy as I  understand  it must  also provide assistance wherever 
1t  is required and justified. 
let me  review briefly the main  factors  involved. 
(a)  It is My  view of  paramount  importance that  European  competition 
policy should be based  on  an approach  to competition which  is consistent with 
econanic reality.  l  constder,  for  instance,  that  it would  not  be  consistent 
with current conditions  in the European  economy  if we  started fran  the  idea 
that every  reduction  in the number  of  independent\y-ope~oting firms 
necessarily entailed less competition.  This  theory,  from the angle of  pure 
logic,  looks convincing,  but it is not  compatible with the current  structure 
of many  EEC  markets.  Agriculture is an  obvious example,  but  we  can also quot~ 
the retai 1  trade or the markets where a  large number  of small  fi  nms  vie with 
a  few  giants.  While  in  such  a  situation tl'!e  smal1  firms,  if operating 
independently,  may  be too sma.ll  to matter .to the big eompantes,  co-operation 
···'··· - s-
may  enable them  to challenge their powerful  rivals.  Here  is a  pract teal 
.·  example fran our  experience: 
The marine paint market  is shared by the big  international  groups and 
a  large number  of  small  manufacturers.  The  big groups  operate sales .agencies 
in all major  ports so that  the purchaser can be offered the  same  product 
everywhere.  This selling point,  of great  importance for  paint  repair work  for 
instance,  is not available to the small  manufacturers.  Their ability to compete 
is restricted.  Now  a  number  of  small  firms fran  several  countries had the  Idea 
that they cou 1  d  off  set the d i sadvantage by  deve  1  oping paints joint  1  y,  1  ay  i ng 
down  certain quality standards and  selling under  the same  trade mark.  This 
project, V.ich transforms the small  firms of merely  local  importance  into 
serious competitors for the international  groups,  was  authorized  by  the 
Commission  since we  expect that will  bring keener competition. 
(b)  As  you  can  see fran this example,  we  are guided  in the assessment 
of the various forms  of co-operation by  the effect the agreements have  on 
aetua1  market  trends.  I  need  not  stress that the effects of a  given agreement 
on  the market may  vary fundamentally according to the market  context.  This  is 
~he reason why  we  feel  that mere f<:nowledge  of the terms of an agreement  is not 
a  sufficient basis for .a declston as; the appllc•tlon of the European  rules of 
c"  '  - ''  ,_,  ;'  •  "•  "• 
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cQIIPEititJ()n.  Ma~ke~ analysis is es~entlal to Europef;)n  competition policy. 
. ..  .. ·  .  ·~lnfluetleit~·'defi~ltten·.·9f  r~·~t:f.lnt· of  ~em~titfon ~tnd consequently the. 
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stands to reason that the rules of canpetltion should apply only to those 
agreements which  appreciably  Influence market  conditions.  Accordingly,  the 
C01111i ss  ion  is ab  1  e  to concentrate on  the rea  Hy  important  cases.  This approach 
is. however,  also in the interest of  firm.s  in the Common  Market.  It is of 
particular  importance for the myriad  of .small  firms.  But  it also benefits the 
eeonauy as a  whole,  since concentration of the Canmunity' s  work  on  a  smaller 
number  of cases facilitates a  more  rapid development  of the case-Jaw. 
(d)  This brings me  to a  problem  I  believe we  must  solve.  Contacts with 
the business \IIOrld  have given me  the  impression that at the present  stage firms 
have everything to gain fran knowing  as  soon as possible ~at is permissible 
and N-tat  is prdl  i b i ted under  European  canpet  i ti  on  law.  Their wishe!l  ; ,,  this 
respect are ccap1ete1y reasonable.  therefore consider it  importaat to 
estabHsh more  precisely exactly what  is forbidden and  above an  what 
opportunities there are for authorization under  our  rules of ccmpetition so 
that firms wi 11  understand as fully as possible the most  important aspects of 
the tanmunity• s  caupetition pol icy. 
We  are endeavouring to achieve this objective in two ways.  The  first few 
years, after the entry into force of thEt  Eurepean  canpetltion law,  were 
.  .  . 
devotedQ18inly to laying tfle foundations,  as>for  instance through  implementing 
- - ~  '  ---"  -- "  -: -- -.  - "  :.  . - ,  ' 
proVisions.  '"* we \are tl"yii\g  to incr&$e steadi iy each  year  the number  of 
.clsi~s·~PI'.··~se:s lnvolvtngrestd~ti~e agreements.·  Last year,.for  instance, 
· <!tiJe  n~re  ~j,85  theilllgh~$tisf~~~ t~~  .s~att of;  E1.1r.oP~n  t n;egrat·i  on.  1  n  dol ng 
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example of this working method  I  may  cite the  latest Commission  decision  In 
the matter of exc  1  us  i ve dea  1 i ng  agreements ....  a  decision which  makes  it poss  i b 1  e 
to settle another eleven hundred  notifications by  simplified procedure.  lt also 
clarifies for the future how  agreements of this type -- that  is exclusive dealing 
agreements for  sales in non•member  countries -- are to be 1egally assessed. 
The  second  way  is based  on  the possibility,  provided for  by  the EEC  Treaty, 
of granting a  block exemption from the ban  on  restrictive agr~nts.  The  Co~ 
mission has already granted a  block exemption for certain exclusive dealing agree-
ments.  We  shall  try to do the same  for other forms  of co-operation.  For example, 
the  pos~ibility is now  being considered of granting a  block exemption for  re• 
search and development  agreements,  for agreements on  the uniform use of standards 
or types,  for specialization agreements,  for joint buying or selling agreements 
and for certain 1  icensing agreements.  We  are also considering whether  the  ~on-
elusion of such  agreements can be  facilitated,  for  instance by withdrawing.the 
notlffcation requirement.,  A  study is also bei11g  made  to find  out  if general 
criteria can be  established to determine whether a  restraint is 
11appreciab1e
11
, 
so as to enable regulatiOns .to be  adop~ed excluding 
11de minlmi su  cases from  the 
scope  of the ru  1  es of canpet  i t i on. 
~  . 
I  do ll()t  intend to hide  tb~  .. fac;it  that.Jhis work  is running lnto great 
difflcultle!i.  ~ tn ·*olmecf.ton.wi·th :the ~gr~SJ1e~f$ t*eferred to,  no experience 
It Is proving ex• 
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This  is a  new  area of the  law  on  restrictive agreements.  We  have moved 
tnto it because we  know  that traditional  pol icy a1one  cannot .cope  adequately 
with today 
1 s  situatIon in the Common  Market.  Under  the pressure of developments, 
European  business  is being forced  to seek  out  new  methods  of  research,  produc-
tion and marketing.  These developments are also compelling European  competi· 
tion policy to break new  ground. 
Policy on  industrial  combination 
Having outlined the basic  ideas behind  our policy on  restrictive agree-
ments.  I  now want  to discuss policy  in the field of  industrial  combination. 
This policy is determined  by  our  concept  of the future structure of  European 
business.  It also depends.  of course,  on  the legal  opportunities provided 
for the C01111i ssion under  the European Treaties. 
In my  view the structures Of  the European markets must  satIsfy two  condi• 
t i ens.  They must  show a  degree of canb  i nation which  is.  sufficiently 1  ow  to 
ensure effective canpetition.  At  the same  time,  however,  the degree of  ccm-
bination must  be sufficiently high to enable firms to attain the size required 
if the problems af research,  production and marketing are to be  solved  rationally. 
Whether firms should work  towards what  they believe to be the right  scale of 
operations through  interncH  growth or throogf'l  amalgamation  is a  deci slon to be 
.  '.  ,_,._  .·-·-
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In any ewant.  my  1mpress1on  •s that .since the beginning 
Eurf.')l)&ilill integriltion a  ~tecldtly incr~slng number  of firms have  been  chopsing 
.·.  ~Cil~t;ion.· At'Cr>re~~t.:~ot:.a day passe$ without  the press  rEI'-
merg~rs.or.ll,lerg~t ll'got.hltlonfi···  f. bel have  that  t.n  the vast maJority 
.·the aHnJs ·t~~dJJi{t:h~~ai~et structur.  in  response to the 
Of·  .:anpetft:f()li /en  ~h~ Europ~n ~t11d ·the )'lor1d  market.  These - 9-
canbinations are,  as a  general rule,  not  aimed at restricting canpetition but 
at  improving competitiveness and  adapting to the new  scale of  the market. 
In these cases,  a  reduction of the  number  of  independent  firms  can  intensify , 
canpetition.  Such  canbinations are  in harmony  with  the objectives of  Eurot>ean 
canpetition policy for,  to use a  quotation fran  your  Supreme  Court  which  aptly 
describes our policy, 
111t is canpetition,  not  canpetitors,  which  the Act 
protects". 
At  present cases of  canbination of  firms fran differing member  countries 
are few and far between.  The  vast majority of amalgamations  remain within the 
national  framework  or  link firms fran a  Member  State with firms  from  outside 
the Community.  The  Commission  is working hard to achieve the elimination of 
these obstacles.  Of  late there have,  h~ever, been  sane cases which  show  that 
the Goverrments of  some  member  countries prefer to restructure  industries  in 
a  national  framework and that  they therefore bring sane pressure to bear to 
prevent multinational  arrangements. 
I  an concerned about this trend.  Quite apart fran the fact  that amalga-
mations between firms fran different Member  States can help to speed up  lnte• 
- -
'  -
gration of the markets,  my  main .point  is that the framework  within which  the new 
market  stru:Ctures are developing  should be .the Cornman  Market  and  not  the  fron• 
th,a  eeuntry' inv()lved.  Jf a  firm wants to canbine with another  firm 
to ~tepup produ~tl~ity, it  ~oould be givertthe opportunity to choose, 
•  •  '  :  ~  - - :  >  • 
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as< a  g~oeral pr  i neap~  e,  thtL~rtner wh 1 ch,  t~  rough  Its range of  product I on  or 
..  \o.lf$  fJI~r{(e~trig  syst~. niaf<e,sihe  b~st IIJ~tch.  Thfs  is a1 $0 a matter of  optimum 
alloeati~nc:Wttiefact6J"~(,fpr~ctlon, upQrt.which  depends  the ecOnomic. success 
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·  ~pee~~~ ol  th~ Econ9!'l e. ·  Conm\lrii ty  • 
···'··· --- '  -
~  .  . 
~  10  "" 
So far  I  have  spoken of  combinations which  we  welcome.  There are,  however, 
also markets - though at the moment  small  in number  - the structure of which 
is already  such that additional  mergers  between certain firms  would  endanger 
workable competition.  The  European Treaties,  which  (Article 3 of  the  EEC 
Treaty)  provide for a  system ensuring that competition is not  distorted,  bind 
the Carmunity to act  if faced with  such a  development.  We  therefore construe 
Article 86,  which prohibits the abuse of a  dominant  position,  to mean  that a 
canbination \rllich eliminates effective competition constitutes a  case of  abuse 
and  is consequently prohibited. 
There are in the present situation,  as national markets are more  and more 
exposed to canpetition fran foreign firms,  and as cOJ\t)etition  increases,  in• 
eluding competition fran non-EEC  firms,  only a  few markets  in which  here  is 
a  threat to workable canpetition.  There has therefore not  so far  been  any 
occasion to apply Article 86  to a  case of amalgamation. 
The  Canmission is doubtless  in a  stronger position with  regard to com-
bination .in  the coal and steel industry,  slnce the  ECSC  Treaty allows. amalga-
mations only if they are authorized by  the .Cajimi ssion.  Recognizing that  these 
indus~ries are pa~sing through a  period of structural  reform,  we  h.ave  in the 
- - ,_  .  -.- ,;  - - - ·.  ' 
erutorsed most  co-Operatioirand tanblnati  on  plans•  But  we  also real i.ze 
- - .  .  . . 
coal,  and  1'8'71:JQ.darly~i~r, w1l( ln  f~tur~ increasingly. pose the prob• 
. ·  ...  Is of the malntenance <lf  c:~ffe~~~~¢ c~petlti<m  between a  sma11  number  of . 
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efficient~  The  establl sh• 
th~ eJ~~~~.n Eeonanlc «;anmurtity  llave provided  ~· 
.  ···'· .. ...  11  -
with a  great opportunity to achieve this.objectfve.  The  process of  integra-
·.  ' 
. tion. which  is  ~preading to an ever-increasing number  of markets,  is re':"' 
.·leasi~g  ~t  imu1 i  ,which can have a creat.ive effect )f the  free play of market 
forces  is safeguarded. 
sibil ity 
• 